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Abstract 
European Union member countries are currently exposed to negative implications of the 
economic and debt crisis. Questions associated with disputable implications of fiscal 
incentives seem to be contrary to the crucial need of the effective fiscal consolidation that is 
necessary to reduce excessive fiscal deficits and high sovereign debts. While challenges 
addressed to the fiscal policy and its anti-cyclical potential rose steadily but not desperately 
since the beginning of the economic crisis, the call for fiscal consolidation became urgent 
almost immediately and this need significantly strengthen after the debt crisis contagion 
flooded Europe. 
In the paper we provide an overview of main trends in public budgets and sovereign debts in 
the Euro Area member countries during last two decades. We identify episodes of successful 
and unsuccessful (cold showers versus gradual) fiscal (expenditure versus revenue based) 
consolidations by analyzing effects of improvements in cyclically adjusted primary balance 
on the sovereign debt ratio reduction. We also estimate VAR model to analyze effects of 
fiscal shocks (based on one standard deviation in total expenditure, direct and indirect taxes) 
to real output. It is expected that responses of real output to different types of (consolidating) 
fiscal shocks may vary and thus provide more precise ideas about a feasibility (i.e. side effects 
on the macroeconomic performance) of expenditure versus revenue based fiscal consolidation 
episodes. Economic effects of fiscal consolidating adjustments are evaluated for two periods 
(pre-crisis and extended) to reveal crisis effects on fiscal consolidation efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
European Union member countries are currently exposed to negative implications of 
the economic and debt crisis. Questions associated with disputable implications of fiscal 
incentives seem to be contrary to the crucial need of the effective fiscal consolidation that is 
necessary to reduce excessive fiscal deficits and high sovereign debts. As a result, 
governments tend to reduce public expenditures and raise taxes during the periods lagging 
recession and thus cooling down economies. However, an appropriate composition of fiscal 
incentives without direct negative effect on the public budget and its revenue and expenditure 
sides may help to reduce negative budgetary pressures through increased tax capacity of the 
economy followed by stronger growth of real output. 
While challenges addressed to the fiscal policy and its anti-cyclical potential rose 
steadily but not desperately since the beginning of the economic crisis, the call for fiscal 
consolidation became urgent almost immediately and this need significantly strengthen after 
the debt crisis contagion flooded Europe. 
The overall success of the fiscal consolidation may seem to differ across countries 
reflecting the overall burden of sovereign debt and associated costs of debt service. 
Significant reduction in primary budget deficit (aiming to primary surplus during a reasonable 
period) is the only way to reduce a negative impact of sovereign debt on economic growth. 
While the need to reduce a fiscal imbalance is clear, the composition (expenditure versus 
revenues based consolidation) and nature (gradual or sharp consolidation) of fiscal 
consolidation, together with the role played by accompanied policies (quantitative monetary 
easing, exchange rate internal versus external devaluation, reforms of fiscal institutions, etc.), 
seems to be quite disputable (Barrios, Langedijk and Penc 2010).  
In the paper we provide an overview of main trends in public budgets and sovereign 
debts in the Euro Area member countries during last two decades. We identify episodes of 
successful and unsuccessful (cold showers versus gradual) fiscal (expenditure versus revenue 
based) consolidations by analyzing effects of improvements in cyclically adjusted primary 
balance on the sovereign debt ratio reduction. We also estimate VAR model to analyze effects 
of fiscal shocks (based on one standard deviation (rise) in total expenditure and (rise) in direct 
and indirect taxes) to real output. It is expected that responses of real output to the different 
types of (consolidating) fiscal shocks may vary and thus provide more precise ideas about a 
feasibility (i.e. side effects on the macroeconomic performance) of expenditure versus 
revenue based fiscal consolidation episodes. Economic effects of fiscal consolidating 
adjustments are evaluated for two periods (pre-crisis and extended) to reveal crisis effects on 
fiscal consolidation efforts. 
Following the introduction, we provide some stylized facts about fiscal stance in the 
Euro Area member countries over the period of last two decades. We emphasize main trends 
in the evolution of government consumption, rate of secondary redistribution, total 
expenditures and total revenues, fiscal deficit and sovereign debt. In the third section we 
provide an overview of current empirical evidence about fiscal consolidation and fiscal policy 
shocks. Wide range of causal effects and implications of expenditure and tax revenue based 
fiscal adjustments as well as their size and durability seem to be well documented in papers 
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published in last two decades. Fourth section begins with some methodological remarks to 
fiscal consolidation and cyclically adjusted primary balance. Subsequent analysis of fiscal 
consolidation episodes provides an in-depth insight into the degree of success of expenditure 
and tax revenue based fiscal adjustments in the view of a sustainable sovereign debt reduction 
in the Euro Area member countries. In section five we deal with fiscal policy shocks trying to 
provide some alternative guideline for evaluation of side economic effects related to 
expenditure and tax based fiscal adjustments on the real output performance. 
  
2. Overview of Fiscal Stance 
Budgetary development in the Euro Area member countries did not follow the same 
trend, though some common patterns seem to be present. In general, relative share of total 
government consumption on overall aggregate expenditures seems to be quite low during last 
two decades (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 General Government Consumption (1995-2015) 
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Note: General government consumption is expressed as a percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
However, there seem to be notable differences among countries especially if we 
emphasize a relative importance as well as the overall trend in the development of the general 
government consumption. Despite generally low differences in the relative share of 
government consumption on total output among the countries at the beginning of the period 
we have observed increased diverging trend since the establishment of the Euro Area. 
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Dynamic increase in the government consumption is present especially in the periphery 
countries like Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal though this trend is also obvious in Belgium, 
Finland and Netherlands. The overall share the general government consumption on the total 
output remained quite different even at the end of the observed period though it seems that 
effects of economic crisis contributed to slight reduction in this gap in the whole group of 
countries. At the same time we emphasize a relatively persistent decreasing trend in the Baltic 
countries and the Slovak republic. 
Rate of the secondary income redistribution represents one of the most crucial 
indicators of the government size (Figure 2). It is also convenient to emphasize the size of 
payable interests to calculate primary government expenditures to express a structural fiscal 
stance of the government. 
 
Figure 2 Size of Government - Rate of Secondary Income Redistribution (1995-2015) 
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Note: Variables - primary government expenditures (GOV_EP) and payable interests (GOV_EI) are expressed 
as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
The size of the government in the Euro Area member countries seems to be quite 
stable in the core countries of the Euro Area, however, countries like Cyprus, Greece and 
Portugal experienced opposite trend (pre-crisis period). Moreover, increasing indebtedness of 
periphery countries affected the relative share of associated interest costs that was clearly 
higher than in the rest of the Euro area in general, though it generally followed decreasing 
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trend due to reduced interest rates on government bonds due to undesirable convergence in 
the long-term interest rates in the whole Euro Area. 
Table 1 provides more detailed information on the relative shares of government 
expenditures and government revenues in the Euro Area member countries during the years 
1995-2015 divided into short-term sub-periods. 
 
Table 1 Total Government Expenditures and Revenues (1995-2015) 
 Total expenditures Total Revenues 
1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 2011-2015 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 2011-2015 
Austria 53.650 50.925 51.400 51.425 51.375 49.700 49.275 48.525 48.300 49.200 
Belgium 51.725 49.475 49.850 51.475 55.225 48.825 49.375 48.850 48.900 51.650 
Cyprus 32.975 35.200 39.325 40.200 43.775 29.900 32.125 36.100 38.675 37.450 
Germany 49.850 46.650 46.250 45.325 44.475 45.225 44.675 43.000 43.425 44.300 
Estonia 39.300 36.950 34.275 40.100 38.200 39.850 36.250 36.325 39.625 38.550 
Spain 42.475 39.025 38.400 42.850 45.800 37.675 38.200 39.125 37.150 37.625 
Finland 57.275 48.700 49.075 51.175 56.600 55.075 53.100 51.875 52.150 54.300 
France 53.675 51.675 52.675 54.600 56.800 49.925 49.875 49.450 49.675 52.325 
Greece 44.975 46.075 46.225 51.125 55.025 37.425 40.725 39.050 40.300 46.250 
Ireland 37.725 32.600 33.325 47.675 41.300 37.975 34.600 34.900 34.450 33.800 
Italy 50.325 46.775 47.175 48.900 59.525 45.350 44.375 43.525 45.450 47.425 
Lithuania 40.675 38.100 34.000 40.150 37.250 35.725 35.275 33.150 35.150 33.375 
Luxembourg 41.275 38.450 41.775 41.650 43.400 44.050 42.850 42.075 43.250 44.075 
Latvia 36.025 37.025 34.600 39.850 37.450 35.950 34.325 33.725 34.275 35.800 
Malta 40.975 41.275 43.025 41.700 42.500 34.125 35.350 38.325 38.450 39.775 
Netherland 47.500 43.075 43.400 45.625 46.675 44.400 43.000 42.225 43.100 43.450 
Portugal 42.700 43.250 45.825 47.950 50.025 38.200 39.650 40.550 41.025 43.775 
Slovenia 46.325 46.175 45.050 45.900 52.175 42.850 42.950 43.300 42.625 44.475 
Slovakia 48.825 47.350 38.975 39.675 40.800 42.725 38.925 36.100 34.775 37.425 
average 45.171 43.092 42.875 45.650 47.283 41.839 41.311 41.062 41.618 42.896 
 
Note: Fiscal indicators are expressed as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
Overview of the relative shares of government expenditures and revenues even 
emphasized the differences in the size of the government in individual Euro Area member 
countries. Generally lower shares of government expenditures on the total output in the 
periphery countries at the beginning of the period and improved conditions on the financial 
markets since the establishment of the Euro Area were followed by more dynamic increase in 
the government expenditures in these countries in comparison with the rest of the Euro Area. 
Moreover, increasing share in government expenditures together with less dynamic increase 
in government expenditures clearly indicates deterioration in fiscal discipline especially in the 
south of the Euro Area. 
As a one the most crucial aspects representing key features of the overview in the 
general government financial stance we emphasize risks of increasing sovereign debt burden 
associate with persistent fiscal deficits that periphery countries of the Euro Area experienced 
during the most of the period of last two decades (Figure 3). Moreover, crisis period 
significantly reduced fiscal sustainability in the periphery countries of the Euro Area (similar 
trend was observed in Baltic countries) that made calls for fiscal consolidation urgent. 
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However, more comprehensive analysis of the budgetary stance is needed to identify 
the overall potential as well as effectiveness of a fiscal consolidation to successfully reduce a 
sovereign debt burden provided that debt constraints strengthened during the crisis period. 
 
Figure 3 Fiscal Deficit and Sovereign Debt (1995-2015) 
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Note: All fiscal indicators are expressed as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
Fiscal implications of the economic crisis vary across Euro Area member countries 
considering existing differences in the financial discipline of fiscal authorities (levels of fiscal 
budget balance and sovereign debt), overall macroeconomic performance and high level of 
heterogeneity of individual markets that in altogether affects the overall costs of fiscal 
consolidation (European Commission, 2012). 
The phenomenon of a permanent deficiency of general government budgets stresses 
many “old” (Austria, France, Greece, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal) as well as 
“new” (Croatia, Cyprus, Czech republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak republic, Slovenia) European Union member countries (of course we 
consider the period before the economic crisis put a stress on revenue and expenditures sides 
of national fiscal budgets). Lack of fiscal discipline in many European Union member 
countries revealed a crucial need of a fiscal consolidation during the crisis period due to a 
sharp acceleration in sovereign debt burden. 
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Figure 4 Changes in Sovereign Debt Ratio (as a percentage to GDP) 
(changes between 2007 and 2015) 
0
40
80
120
160
200
AT BE CY DE
EA
19 EE ES F
I
FR GR IE IT LT LU LV MT NE PT S
I
SK
2007 2015  
 
Note: Changes in sovereign debt ratio between 2007 and 2015 (as a percentage to GDP). 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
Figure 4 provides brief overview of the dynamic in the sovereign debt accumulation in 
individual Euro Area member countries comparing debt burden in 2000 and 2015. Results 
clearly demonstrate significant accumulation of sovereign debts in the periphery countries of 
the Euro Area and even stressed the risks of fiscal unsustainability especially in GIIPS 
countries. 
 
Figure 5 Changes in Sovereign Debt Ratio (as a percentage to GDP) (1995-2015) 
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
AT BE CY DE
EA
19 EE ES F
I
FR GR IE IT LT LU LV MT NE PT S
I
SK
1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 2011-2015
 
Note: Changes in sovereign debt ratio (as a percentage to GDP) during a particular sub-period. Positive change 
represents an increase and negative change a decrease in sovereign debt burden. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
Figure 5 provides overview of changes in the accumulation of sovereign debts in the 
Euro Area member countries during the years 1995-2015 divided into short-term sub-periods. 
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While the negative trend of the significant increase in the sovereign debt experienced mostly 
countries from the periphery of the Euro Area during the crisis period, significant debt 
accumulation was also examined during the initial stage after the establishment of the Euro 
Area. However, our results indicate that all Euro Area member countries experienced a 
considerable increase in public debt burden during the crisis period. As a result, 
improvements in the fiscal stance, fiscal sustainability and reduction the risk of default 
required flexible responses of governments to the negative pressures on the both expenditure 
and revenue sides of their budgets. 
While sudden changes in the fiscal policy framework accompanied by large 
adjustments in the budgetary components generally help to improve fiscal discipline and 
reduces occurrence of excessive fiscal deficits, both theoretical and empirical literature 
provide lot of evidence about negative (contractionary) effects of fiscal consolidation or in 
fact, fiscal restriction. As a result, effects of fiscal policy shocks and proper composition of 
fiscal consolidation are still subject of rigorous academic and political discussions. 
 
3. Overview of the Literature 
Fiscal consolidation based on tax increases and expenditures cuts is well documented 
in empirical literature. Tsibouris, Horton, Flanagan and Maliszewski (2006) provided an 
overview of the experience of countries that have challenged large fiscal adjustments in the 
last three decades. By identifying periods of successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations 
authors provide operational guidance to policymakers related to various aspects of fiscal 
adjustments, including common policy approaches, institutional arrangements and causal 
implications of various fiscal decisions. Barrios, Langedijk and Pench (2010) from estimated 
econometric models revealed determinants of successful fiscal consolidation while 
considering large scale of preconditions, including impacts of financial crisis, debt and deficit 
levels, real exchange rate adjustments, effects on economic growth as well as types of fiscal 
consolidation. Alesina and Perotti (1997) analyzed how the composition of fiscal adjustments 
(gradual versus sharp consolidation, expenditures versus tax revenues based consolidation) 
influences their likelihood of success in the view of long lasting deficit reduction, and their 
macroeconomic consequences. Overall success of fiscal consolidation is also evaluated 
concerning initial fiscal stance. Briotti (2002) analyzed the fiscal consolidation process in EU 
countries over the 1990s. From observed periods of fiscal adjustments authors highlight that 
revenue based adjustments have generally preceded expenditure based adjustments. Alesina 
and Ardagna (2009) examined the evidence of fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustments episodes 
in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Authors discuss effects of adjustments on the 
spending and revenues sides concluding that tax cuts seem to have higher expansionary 
potential that spending increases while spending cuts associated with fiscal adjustments are 
more appropriate for stabilizing the sovereign debt than tax increases while having less 
deteriorating effect of the real output performance. 
Implications and expected success of fiscal consolidation is largely dependent on 
effects of tax (revenue) and expenditure based adjustments in the government budget on the 
overall macroeconomic performance. Contribution of fiscal policy shocks to i.e. slowdown in 
real output growth rates may provide useful information about contrary effects of fiscal 
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consolidation and thus a convenient prospect about more feasible composition of fiscal policy 
arrangements. 
Effects of fiscal policy shocks are also well documented especially on a sample of 
developed countries. Blanchard and Perotti (Blanchard and Perotti, 1999) used mixed 
structural VAR/event study approach to identify the automatic responses of taxes and 
government spending to economic activity. They also argued that positive government 
spending shocks have a positive effect on output, and positive tax shocks have a negative 
effect, while the multipliers for both spending and tax shocks are typically small. 
Perotti (Perotti, 2002) implemented SVAR approach in order to analyze the effect of 
fiscal policy on GDP, prices and interest rates in five OECD countries. The results we may 
conclude as follows: 1) The effects of fiscal policy on GDP and its components have become 
substantially weaker in the last 20 years; 2) The tax multipliers tend to be negative but small; 
3) Once plausible values of the price elasticity of governments spending are imposed, the 
negative effects of government spending on prices that have been frequently estimated 
become positive, although usually small and not always significant; 4) Government spending 
shocks have significant effects on the real short-term interest rate, but uncertain signs; 5) Net 
tax shocks have very small effects on prices; 6) The U.S. is an outlier in many dimensions; 
U.S. responses to fiscal shocks are often not representative of the average OECD country 
included in this sample. 
Giuliodori and Beetsma (Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2004) also implemented few 
identifications schemes using VAR methodology to analyze the (spill-over) effects of fiscal 
policy shocks in European economies. Their analysis is focused on the indirect channel of 
transmitting the fiscal policy shocks that affect an import of the country. They also 
emphasized a necessity of enhanced fiscal coordination at the macroeconomic level. 
Romer and Romer (Romer and Romer, 2007) analyze the causes and consequences in 
the level of taxation in the postwar U.S. Their results indicate that tax changes have very large 
effects on output. At the same time output effects are very persistent. Authors argue it is due 
to the strong response of investments to the tax burden decrease. 
Caldara and Camps (Caldara and Camps, 2008) provide an empirical evidence on the 
response of key macroeconomic variables to government spending and tax revenue shocks for 
the U.S. over the period 1955-2006. Authors implemented four approaches (the recursive 
approach, the Blanchard-Perotti approach, the sign-restrictions approach and the event-study 
approach) to identify their system based on the VAR methodology. While there is the 
empirical evidence that the positive responses of private consumption and the real wage are 
very persistent, authors argued that the most current-generation DSGE models consistent with 
an increase in these variables predict that the responses turn negative already about one year 
after the government spending shock occurs. They also find strongly diverging results as 
regards the effects of tax shocks depending on the identification approach used, with the 
estimated effects of unanticipated tax increases ranging from non-distortionary to strongly 
distortionary. 
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4. Fiscal Consolidation 
4.1 Methodological Notes to Fiscal Consolidation 
Fiscal consolidation is usually addressed to the set of fiscal arrangements on the side 
of revenues and/or expenditures of the government budget in order to reduce a burden of 
sovereign debt via improved fiscal stance. As a result, crucial fiscal adjustments are employed 
relying primarily on expenditures cuts (especially in the area of government consumption and 
social security transfers) and much lower portion is based on tax increases (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1997). Another type of fiscal adjustments rely especially on the tax and social 
contributions increases. While the first type of fiscal adjustments is expansionary and usually 
has longer durability, second type of fiscal adjustments is restrictive, having contractionary 
effects on the economy and thus representing risks associated with future reductions in the tax 
capacity of the country. 
There seems to be several approaches to measure fiscal consolidation and to evaluate a 
success of fiscal consolidation episode. For example, Alesina and Ardagna (2009) identify 
three types of fiscal adjustment episodes. For the purpose of our study we employ two of 
these measures slightly revised by Barrios, Langedijk and Pench (2010): (1) Fiscal 
consolidation is the year at which CAPB improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP (so called 
cold shower) or (2) takes the place over three years provided CAPB will not deteriorate by 
more than 0.5 percent of GDP (so called gradual consolidation). Considering both 
definitions, cold showers (consolidations during one year) are recognized as full episodes of 
fiscal consolidation and each year of gradual consolidation are considered as episodes on their 
own. The last measure reflects the overall success of fiscal consolidation. Fiscal adjustments 
are evaluated according to their effects on sovereign debt and fiscal CAPB ratios to GDP and 
real output performance. (3) Fiscal consolidation is revealed as successful provided it helps to 
reduce sovereign debt to GDP ratio by 5 percent during three subsequent years after we have 
recognized an initiation of the fiscal episode. At the same time, successful fiscal consolidation 
is considered to be an effective only if it is able to bring down a debt ratio while not having 
deteriorating effect on real output. 
 
4.2 Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
To assess detailed overview of fiscal consolidation effects it is necessary to estimate 
an influence of fiscal adjustments based on tax and/or expenditures changes on fiscal balance. 
However, it seems to be necessary to reveal changes on revenues and expenditures sides of 
government balance associated with automatic effects induced by changes in macroeconomic 
environment and effects of discretionary fiscal policy actions. In first case, i.e. a cool-down of 
real output growth may be followed by a cut in government revenues (due to reduced tax 
capacity of an economy in the time of crisis) and an increase in government expenditures (i.e. 
due higher unemployment benefits). As a result, deterioration of a fiscal balance will occur. 
At the same time, similar effects on the fiscal balance will be followed by discretionary taxes 
cuts or expenditures increases. A fiscal stance of a government budget may thus reflect mixed 
effects of automatic changes in budgetary revenues and expenditures associated with business 
cycle fluctuations as well as discrete changes on both sides of government budgets associated 
with discrete fiscal policy actions. 
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To eliminate effects of a business cycle to the fiscal stance of a government budget it 
is necessary to eliminate influence of cyclical movements of fiscal variables. As a result of 
filtered business cycle impacts, together with some other adjustments (i.e. exclusion of 
interest payable on the side of government expenditures), cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) will be calculated. Empirical literature provides many approaches to calculate CAPB. 
In general, main algorithm follows the same procedure: (1) estimation of the potential GDP, 
(2) determination and calculation of key revenues and expenditures categories responses to 
the fluctuations in cyclical GDP, (3) adjustments in budgetary revenues and expenditures 
according to the cyclical effects in both sides of government budget. As a result we obtain 
cyclically adjusted structural or primary balance. On the other hand we have found some 
differences in step (2) in current empirical literature reflecting relative diversity in approaches 
employed to estimate income elasticities of main budgetary variables (on both revenue and 
expenditure sides). At the same time, most studies calculated cyclical component in real 
output by estimating potential output (and output gap) using simple HP filter2 or potential 
employment based on detrending NAIRU calculations. 
Bouthevillain et al. (2001) calculated fiscal elasticities using econometric regressions 
or derivation from tax or expenditures laws and from detailed information on the distribution 
of income and revenue. Altãr, Necula and Bobeica (2010) estimated tax and revenues 
elasticities by applying methodology similar to that employed by OECD and by the European 
Commission. Authors decomposed main components of revenue and expenditure budgetary 
sides using linear system of equations. Girouard and André (2005) calculated income 
elasticities of four different types of taxes while on the expenditure side there is only single 
item - unemployment related transfers - that authors treated as cyclically sensitive. 
Günaydın and Uğraş Ülkü (2002) employed vector-error correction (VEC) model to 
estimate income elasticities of budgetary components. Provided there is a long-run 
equilibrium (cointegration) between GDP and budgetary variables, expected elasticity 
coefficients are represented by normalized cointegrating coefficient derived from 
cointegrating equations. 
To cyclically adjust a government budget, that is to estimate the underlying fiscal 
position when cyclical and/or automatic components are removed we follow a VEC 
methodology implemented by Günaydın and Uğraş Ülkü (2002). 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) is calculated by subtracting the cyclical 
component ( )CB  from the primary government balance ( )PB : 
 
,
1
  =  
n
C C
t t t t t i
i
CAPB PB B PB B
=
= − − ∑      (1) 
 
where ( )PB  represents actual government budget balance ( )B  less interests payable ( )IE : 
 
                                                          
2 Despite a wide criticism of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for inducing a spurious cycle in the time series (i.e. it 
cannot reflect an impact of structural breaks) as well as for poor approximation near the endpoint (so called 
endpoint bias), it still represents one of most frequently used filter in the current empirical literature. 
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 It tPB B E= −       (2) 
 
and ( ),Ct iB  represents a cyclical component of each of n revenue and expenditure budgetary 
categories included in the model given by the following equation: 
 
, ,  .  . 
C gap
t i t i i tB B e Y=      (3) 
 
where ( )ie  represent individual elasticities of each particular budget category (that responds 
automatically to real output fluctuations) included in the model and ( )gapY  represents output 
gap expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
4.3 Income Elasticities of Budgetary Categories 
In our model we include three types of budget revenues (revenues from direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and social contributions) and one budget expenditure category (unemployment 
related transfers) that seem to respond to short-run (cyclical) movements in real output. As a 
result, we expect that selected fiscal variables automatically respond to the cyclical 
fluctuations in real output. 
To estimate income elasticities of budgetary categories we expect that there is a long-
run equilibrium relationship (cointegration) between each included fiscal variable and real 
output. Cointegration methodology introduced by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) will be employed to estimate the long-rum equilibrium relationships between 
different types of budgetary variables and real output in the Euro Area member countries. 
Johansen method is applied to the unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model that can be 
written by the following moving average representation of n non-stationary variables 
containing p lagged values: 
 
1 21 2 ... tt p t pt tY AY A Y A Y εµ −− −= + + + + +      (4) 
 
where tY   is a   1n x vector of the contemporaneous endogenous variables,  μ is a   1n x  vector 
of the constants, iA  are   n x n  polynomial variance-covariance matrix, ( )0,t nN εε ∑  is a 
  1n x  normalized vector of exogenous shocks (innovations) to the model representing 
unexplained changes in the variables. 
If at least two of the variables are cointegrated of the order one (I(1)) the VAR 
representation in the equation (4) can be rewritten by subtracting 1tY −  to the following vector 
error correction model (VECM): 
 
1
1
        tt t p t i
p
i
i
Y Y Yµ ε− −
−
=
+ Π += Γ∆ + ∆∑      (5) 
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where tY∆  is a   1n x  vector of the first differences of stochastic variables tY , 
1
p
i
i
A I
=
Π = −∑ , 
1
p
i j
j i
A
= +
Γ = −∑ , I is   n x n  identity matrix. 
Presented VECM contains information on both short-term and long-term adjustments to 
changes in tY  included in estimated Γ and Π respectively. Γ is a   n x n  matrix that represents 
the short-term dynamic - adjustments to changes in tY . Π is a   n x n  matrix consisting of the 
long-run coefficients - the cointegrating relationships (cointegrating vectors) and of the error 
correction term. Π can be decomposed as follows: 
 
'αβΠ =       (6) 
 
where α  represents   n x r  a loading matrix containing coefficients that describe the 
contribution of the r long-term (cointegrating) relationships in the individual equations and 
denotes the speed of adjustment from disequilibrium, while β  is a   n x r  matrix of long-run 
coefficients and represents the r linearly independent cointegrating vectors (each column of 
β  is the cointegrating vector). The number of cointegrating relations among variables of tY  is 
the same as the rank (r) for the matrix Π. If it has a full rank, the rank r n=  and it means 
there are n cointegrating relationships and that all variables are I(0). If a vector tY  is a vector 
of endogenous variables that are I(1), then all terms in equation (5) are I(0), and 1tY −Π  must 
be also stationary for I(0)nε   to be white noise. If the matrix Π has reduced rank, r n< , 
there are 1n −  cointegrating vectors and even if all endogenous variables in the model are 
I(1), the level-based long-run component would be stationary. VECM requires that there 
exists at least one cointegrating relationship. 
In order to find a presence of cointegrating (long-run) relationships, we use trace test 
and maximum eigenvalue test. Determination of rank and estimation of the coefficients are 
computed as maximum likelihood estimation. The corresponding likelihood-ratio test 
statistics are: 
 
( ) ( )
1
ln 1
n
trace i
i r
Trl l
− +
= − −∑

  ( ) ( )max 1ln, 1 1 rTr rl l += −+ −

  (7) 
 
where r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis and l

 is the 
estimated value for the ith ordered eigenvalue from the Π matrix. Under the trace statistic, the 
null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r  is tested 
against the alternative that there are more than r vectors. Whereas under the maximum 
eigenvalue test the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors is tested against the 
alternative of 1r +  cointegrating vectors. 
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Provided that time series for direct tax revenues, indirect tax revenues, social 
contributions, unemployment related transfers and real output are I(1)3 we estimate four 
different VEC models employing quarterly data for the period 2000Q1-2015Q2 (62 
observations) for government expenditures, real output, inflation, tax revenues and long-term 
interest rates on 10-year government bonds drawn from Eurostat - Government Finance 
Statistics (October 2016) and IMF database (International Financial Statistics, October 2016). 
Time series for direct tax revenues, indirect tax revenues, social contributions, unemployment 
related transfers and real output were seasonally adjusted. Tests for the cointegration were 
computed using two lags as recommended by the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). 
Results of both Johansen cointegration procedures (trace statistics and maximum 
eigenvalue statistics) confirmed our hypothesis about existence of one long-run equilibrium 
(cointegrating) relationship between each fiscal variable and real output. Normalized 
cointegrating coefficients derived from each cointegrating equation represent elasticity 
coefficients of each fiscal category with respect to real output. 
 
4.4 Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation 
The figure 6 reveals identified episodes of fiscal consolidation in the Euro Area 
member countries as well as the degree of their success since 2000. Our results are contrary to 
conclusions assessed by i.e. Barrios, Langedijk and Pench (2010) who performed 
investigation about a degree of fiscal consolidation success on the sample of EU15 countries 
since 1970. It seems that governments in our sample of countries significantly seek an effort 
to undertake gradual multi-year fiscal consolidations and thus strengthen financial discipline 
during a significant period of their political cycle. 
 
Figure 6 Fiscal Consolidation Episodes (2000Q1-2015Q2) 
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3 Detail results of unit root test are not reported here to save space. Like any other results, they are available upon 
request from the author. 
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Note: Variables - cyclically adjusted primary balance - CAPB (GOV_B_CA) and annual rate (on quarterly basis) 
of the real GDP growth (GDP_RR) are expressed in percentage (right axis in figures). Sovereign debt (GOV_D) 
is expressed as percentage share on GDP (left axis in figures). Real effective exchange rate (REER) is expressed 
as index (left axis in figures) (2010 = 100) 
 unsuccessful one-year consolidation  unsuccessful gradual consolidation 
 successful one-year consolidation  successful gradual consolidation 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Austria experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2000Q3-2001Q2) seems to be expenditure based, as it was associated with 
moderate decrease in budgetary expenditures at faster rates than associated increase in 
revenues4 (especially from direct taxes)). Despite examined positive trend in both budgetary 
expenditures and revenues, CAPB did not improved strong enough to induce a significant 
reduction in sovereign debt. At the same time, it doesn’t seem to be effective because at the 
end of the episode it reduced initial increase in the rate of a real GDP growth. During this 
period REER appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful 
consolidation (2005Q3-2006Q2) seems to be expenditure based as it was associated with 
significant reduction in budgetary expenditure (due to decrease in other expenditures). It 
seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period moderately 
increased. The rate of REER appreciation was just a negligible that is why it did not reduce 
consolidation effort. Third, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q3-2014Q3) seems to be 
both expenditure (compensation of employees) and revenues based (especially due to increase 
in direct taxes). It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
period significantly decreased. Despite initial decrease in REER, since the second half of the 
period REER started to follow appreciation trend and thus it did not contribute to the 
consolidation effort. 
Belgium experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, gradual successful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2002Q4) seems to be expenditure based, as it was associated with 
moderate decrease in budgetary expenditures. However, it doesn’t seem to be effective 
because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During this period REER 
appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation 
(2005Q2-2006Q1) seems to be expenditure based since we have examined a moderate 
decrease in other expenditures. However, it seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real 
                                                          
4 Development of budgetary components in this section is evaluated according to their share in GDP. 
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GDP growth during this period slightly decreased. During this period REER moderately 
depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Third, gradual unsuccessful 
consolidation (2011Q4-2014Q3) seems to be revenue based as revenues from both direct and 
indirect taxes increased. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth 
during this period slightly increased (despite positive trend in the real output development 
during the last quarter of the episode). During this period REER followed appreciation trend 
and thus it did not contribute to the consolidation effort (despite a depreciation trend that was 
initiated at the end of the episode). 
Cyprus experienced five fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2003Q3-2004Q2) seems to be revenue based, as it was associated with 
significant increase in budgetary revenues (especially from indirect taxes). Despite examined 
positive trend in budgetary revenues and moderate improvement in CAPB sovereign debt 
slightly increased during this episode. However, it seems to be effective because during this 
episode the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER appreciated and 
thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation (2004Q4-
2005Q3) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution refers to an 
increase in direct taxes (together with negligible increase in indirect taxes) and minor decrease 
in intermediate consumption. However, it seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real 
GDP growth during this period slightly decreased. During this episode REER moderately 
depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Third, one-year successful 
consolidation (2006Q1-2006Q4) seems to be also revenue based due to reasonable increase in 
direct taxes and less dynamic increase in indirect taxes together with a minor decrease in 
government expenditures. It also seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth 
during this episode slightly increased. However, during this period REER appreciated and 
thus it did not contribute to the consolidation effort. Forth, gradual unsuccessful consolidation 
(2009Q3-2011Q2) seems to be revenue based though the key component, direct taxes, 
experienced just a moderate increase. It also seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real 
GDP growth during this period slightly decreased (despite increased dynamic of real output 
during few quarters in the middle of the episode). During this period REER moderately 
depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Fifth, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2014Q1-2014Q4) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main 
contribution refers to a reduction in government expenditures (capital transfers). However, it 
seem to be effective because during this period the country experienced a decreasing trend in 
the real output deterioration. During this period REER moderately depreciated and thus 
contributed to consolidation effort. 
Germany experienced six fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2000Q4) seems to be expenditure based, as it was associated with 
sharp decrease in government expenditures (increase in direct taxes was associated with a 
reduction in indirect taxes that is why revenue side did not contribute to consolidation effort). 
It seems to be ineffective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. 
During this period REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Second, 
gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2002Q3-2005Q2) seems to be expenditure based due to 
minor decrease in all key components of government expenditures. It also seems to be 
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ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period slightly decreased. 
During this episode REER appreciated that is why it did not contribute to consolidation effort. 
Third, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2005Q3-2008Q2) seems to be both expenditure 
and revenue based due to minor decrease in expenditures and more dynamic increase in 
revenues. Main contribution refers to an increase in indirect taxes and minor decrease in 
compensation of employees and social benefits. It also seems to be ineffective because the 
rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During this period REER followed 
appreciation trend and thus it did not contributed to the consolidation effort. Forth, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2008Q3-2009Q2) seems to be revenue based due to increase 
in indirect taxes. It also seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during 
this period significantly decreased. During this period REER followed appreciation trend and 
thus it did not contribute to the consolidation effort. Fifth, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2011Q2-2012Q1) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based. Main 
contribution refers to more dynamic decrease in government expenditures (social benefits and 
capital transfers). However, it doesn’t seem to be effective because during this episode the 
rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During this period REER depreciated and thus 
contributed to consolidation effort. Sixth, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2012Q3-
2015Q2) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based. Main contribution refers to 
moderate decrease in capital investments and increase in direct taxes. However, it seems to be 
effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period slightly increased. During 
this period REER followed depreciation trend that is why it contributed to consolidation 
effort. 
Estonia experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2000Q4) seems to be purely revenue based due to significant decrease 
in government expenditures (during this period CAPB improved despite reduction in 
government revenues). It seems to be effective because during this period the rate of a real 
GDP growth did not change at all. During this period REER did not experience any 
significant shift and thus it was in neutral stance. Second, gradual unsuccessful consolidation 
(2001Q1-2004Q4) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution 
refers to small increase in direct taxes and decrease in intermediate consumption and capital 
investments. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
period decreased. During this period REER appreciated and thus it did not contribute to 
consolidation effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to 
be purely revenue based (during this period CAPB improved despite significant increase in 
government expenditures, i.e. social benefits and compensation of employees) and main 
contribution refers to an increase in indirect taxes and social contributions. It seems to be 
ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period significantly dropped. 
During this episode REER slightly depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. 
Forth, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q1-2010Q4) seems to be expenditure based 
(during this period CAPB improved despite significant decrease in revenues, i.e. both direct 
and indirect taxes). Main contribution refers to a decrease in compensation of employees and 
social benefits. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
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period significantly increased. During this period REER did not experience any significant 
shift and thus it was in neutral stance. 
Spain experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, gradual successful consolidation 
(2003Q3-2006Q2) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based as it was associated with 
moderate decrease in budgetary expenditures (compensation of employees) and increase in 
both direct and indirect taxes. Moreover, it seems to be effective because during this period 
the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this episode REER appreciated that is why it 
reduced consolidation effort. Second, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2009Q3-2012Q2) 
seems to be revenue due to increase mainly in direct taxes. It seems to be effective because 
the rate of a real GDP deterioration significantly reduced during this episode. During this 
period REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Third, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2013Q1-2013Q4) seems to be both expenditure and revenue 
based as it was associated with decrease in budgetary expenditures (capital transfers) and 
moderate increase in indirect taxes. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP 
deterioration significantly reduced during this episode. During this period REER followed 
appreciation trend and thus it did not contribute to the consolidation effort. 
Finland experienced just one fiscal consolidation. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2000Q4) seems to be both revenue and revenue based, as it was 
associated with increase in budgetary revenues (direct taxes) and reduction in government 
expenditures (compensation of employees and social contributions). However, it doesn’t seem 
to be effective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During 
this period REER depreciated and thus it contributed to consolidation effort. 
France experienced just one fiscal consolidation. First, gradual unsuccessful 
consolidation (2010Q3-2014Q2) seems to be revenue based, as it was associated with 
significant increase in budgetary revenues (both direct and indirect taxes). It seems to be 
effective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this 
period REER moderately depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. 
Greece experienced two fiscal consolidations. First, gradual unsuccessful 
consolidation (2009Q3-2012Q4) seems to be purely revenue based, as it was associated with 
significant increase in budgetary revenues (both direct and indirect taxes, capital transfers). 
During this period CAPB improved despite moderate increase in government expenditures. It 
also seems to be ineffective because during this episode the rate of a real GDP growth 
decreased. During this period REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. 
Second, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2013Q2-2014Q1) seems to be both revenue and 
expenditure based and main contribution refers to an increase in direct and indirect taxes and 
minor decrease in compensations of employees, social benefits and capital transfers. It also 
seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period slightly 
increased. Rate of REER appreciation nearly stagnated and thus not weakening consolidation 
effort. 
Ireland experienced five fiscal consolidations. First, one-year successful 
consolidation (2002Q2-2003Q1) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based. Main 
contribution refers to more dynamic increase in government revenues (indirect taxes) and 
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moderate decrease in government expenditures (capital investments). It seems to be effective 
because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER 
appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation 
(2003Q3-2004Q2) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution 
refers to an increase in direct and less dynamic increase in indirect taxes and minor decrease 
in government expenditures (intermediate consumption and capital investments). It also 
seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period slightly 
increased. During this episode REER slightly appreciated and thus reduced consolidation 
effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q4-2011Q3) seems to be both 
revenue and expenditure based due to really sharp reduction in government expenditures 
(capital transfers and capital investments) and moderate increase in government revenues 
(direct taxes). It also seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
episode slightly increased. During this period REER moderately appreciated and thus reduced 
consolidation effort. Forth, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2012Q1-2012Q4) seems to 
be both expenditure and revenue based and main contribution refers to dynamic reduction in 
government expenditures (capital transfers, capital investments and intermediate 
consumption) and moderate increase in government revenues (direct and indirect taxes). It 
seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. 
During this episode REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Fifth, 
gradual successful consolidation (2013Q1-2015Q2) seems to be purely expenditure based, as 
it was associated with another wave of considerable decrease in government expenditures 
(compensation of employees and social benefits). It seems to be effective because during this 
episode the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER depreciated and 
thus contributed to consolidation effort. 
Italy experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2002Q3-2003Q2) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based, as it was 
associated with moderate decrease in government expenditures (intermediate consumptions 
and capital investments) and moderate increase in government revenues (capital taxes). It 
seems to be effective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth moderately 
increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. 
Second, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2006Q3-2009Q2) seems to be purely revenue 
based (during this period CAPB improved despite increase in government expenditures) and 
main contribution refers to increase direct taxes and social contributions. It seems to be 
ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this episode considerably decreased. 
During this period REER moderately appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. 
Third, gradual unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q3-2013Q2) seems to be also revenue based 
(during this period CAPB improved despite increase in government expenditures) and main 
contribution refers to increase direct and indirect taxes. It seems to be ineffective because the 
rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During this period REER moderately 
appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. 
Lithuania experienced five fiscal consolidations. First, gradual unsuccessful 
consolidation (2001Q2-2004Q3) seems to be expenditure based (during this period CAPB 
improved despite decrease in government revenues), as it was associated with decrease in 
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social benefits capital transfers. It seems to be effective because during this period the rate of 
a real GDP growth increased. During this episode REER moderately appreciated and thus 
slightly reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2009Q1-
2009Q4) seems to revenue based and main contribution refers to an increase in indirect taxes. 
It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period increased. 
During this period REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Third, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q1-2010Q4) seems to be expenditure based (during this 
period CAPB improved despite moderate decrease in government revenues) and main 
contribution refers to an increase in compensation of employees and social benefits. It seems 
to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During 
this period REER depreciation trend and thus contributed to the consolidation effort. Forth, 
one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2012Q1-2012Q4) seems to be expenditure based 
(during this period CAPB improved despite moderate decrease in government revenues) and 
main contribution refers to decrease in compensation of employees, social benefits and capital 
investments. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
period decreased. During this period REER did not experience any significant shift and thus it 
was in neutral stance. Fifth, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2013Q2-2014Q1) seems to 
be both expenditure and revenue based, as it was associated with decrease in budgetary 
expenditures (compensation of employees and social benefits) and increase in government 
revenues (indirect taxes and capital transfers). It seems to be ineffective because during this 
episode the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During this period REER appreciated and 
thus reduced consolidation effort. 
Luxembourg experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2001Q1-2001Q4) seems to be revenue based (during this period CAPB 
improved despite moderate increase in government expenditures) and main contribution refers 
to indirect taxes. It seems to be effective because during this period the rate of a real GDP 
growth decreased. During this period REER did not experience any significant shift and thus 
it was in neutral stance. Second, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2008Q4-2009Q3) 
seems to be also revenue based (during this period CAPB improved despite considerable 
increase in government expenditures) due increase in direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
contributions. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
episode slightly decreased. During this period REER appreciated and thus reduced 
consolidation effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2011Q4-2012Q3) seems to 
be revenue based and main contribution refers to an increase in indirect taxes and social 
contributions. It also seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
period considerably decreased. During this period REER slightly depreciated and thus 
contributed to consolidation effort. 
Latvia experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year successful 
consolidation (2004Q4-2005Q3) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based, as it was 
associated with decrease in government expenditures (intermediate consumption, 
compensation of employees and capital investments) and increase in government revenues 
(indirect taxes and capital transfers). It seems to be effective because during this period the 
rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER did not experience any 
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significant shift and thus it was in neutral stance. Second, one-year unsuccessful consolidation 
(2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to be revenue based (during this period CAPB improved despite 
moderate increase in government expenditures) and main contribution refers to an increase in 
social contributions and sales. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP 
growth during this period considerable decreased. During this period REER appreciated and 
thus reduced consolidation effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2009Q4-
2010Q3) seems to be revenue based and main contribution refers to an increase in direct and 
indirect taxes. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this 
period increased. During this period REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation 
effort. 
Malta experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2000Q4) seems to be expenditure based (during this period CAPB 
improved despite decrease in government revenues), as it was associated with 
decompensation of employees and social benefits. It seems to be effective because during this 
period the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER moderately 
appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation 
(2004Q3-2005Q2) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution 
refers to an increase in indirect taxes and capital transfers and decrease in compensation of 
employees and capital transfers. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP 
growth during this episode decreased. During this period REER did not experience any 
significant shift and thus it was in neutral stance. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation 
(2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to be expenditure based and main contribution refers to a decrease 
in intermediate consumption and capital investments. It seems to be ineffective because the 
rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During this period REER followed 
appreciation trend and thus it did not contribute to the consolidation effort. 
Netherlands experienced three fiscal consolidations. First, one-year successful 
consolidation (2000Q1-2000Q4) seems to be both expenditure and revenue based, as it was 
associated with decrease in budgetary expenditures (compensation of employees and social 
benefits) and just a moderate increase in budgetary revenues (social contributions). It seems to 
be ineffective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During this 
period REER depreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful 
consolidation (2004Q2-2005Q1) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main 
contribution refers to an increase in direct taxes and social contributions and decrease in 
social benefits and capital investments. It also seems to be effective because the rate of a real 
GDP growth during this period increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus 
reduced consolidation effort. Third, gradual successful consolidation (2010Q3-2013Q2) 
seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution refers to increase in 
social contributions and decrease in intermediate consumption, compensation of employees 
and capital investments. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth 
during this period decreased. During this episode REER did not experience any significant 
shift and thus it was in neutral stance. 
Portugal experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, gradual unsuccessful 
consolidation (2001Q4-2004Q3) seems to be revenue based, as it was associated with 
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increase in budgetary revenues (during this period CAPB improved despite increase in 
government expenditures) and the main contribution refers to increase in direct taxes and 
social contributions. It seems to be ineffective because during this period the rate of a real 
GDP growth slightly decreased. During this period REER appreciated and thus reduced 
consolidation effort. Second, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2005Q4-2006Q3) seems to 
be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution refers to an increase in indirect 
taxes and direct taxes and decrease in the intermediate consumption, compensation of 
employees and capital investments. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP 
growth during this period slightly increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus 
reduced consolidation effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2010Q4-2011Q3) 
seems to be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution refers to an increase in 
indirect taxes and direct taxes and slight reduction in compensation of employees. It seems to 
be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During this 
period REER followed appreciation trend and thus reduced consolidation effort. Forth, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2012Q1-2012Q4) seems to be expenditure based and main 
contribution refers to decrease in intermediate consumption, compensation of employees and 
capital investments. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during 
this period decreased. During this period REER slightly depreciated and thus contributed to 
consolidation effort. 
Slovenia experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2001Q2-2002Q1) seems to be both revenue and expenditure based, as it was 
associated with increase in budgetary revenues (indirect taxes) and decrease in budgetary 
expenditures (subsidies, other current expenditures and capital transfers). It seems to be 
ineffective because during this period the rate of a real GDP growth decreased. During this 
period REER appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2009Q1-2009Q4) seems to be revenue based and main 
contribution refers to an increase in social contributions. It seems to be ineffective because the 
rate of a real GDP growth during this period considerably decreased. During this period 
REER depreciated and thus contributed to consolidation effort. Third, one-year unsuccessful 
consolidation (2011Q3-2012Q1) seems to be both expenditures and revenue based and main 
contribution refers to decrease in social benefits and capital transfers and increase in social 
contributions and sales. It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth 
during this period decreased. During this period REER depreciated and thus contributed to 
consolidation effort. Forth, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2013Q4-2014Q3) seems to 
be expenditure based (during this period CAPB improved despite decrease in government 
revenues) and main contribution refers to a decrease in intermediate consumption, 
compensation of employees, social benefits and capital transfers. It seems to be effective 
because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period increased. During this period REER 
followed depreciation trend and thus contributed to consolidation effort. 
Slovak republic experienced five fiscal consolidations. First, one-year successful 
consolidation (2000Q4-2001Q3) seems to be expenditure based (during this period CAPB 
improved despite decrease in government revenues) and main contribution refers to decrease 
in capital transfers and other current expenditures. It seems to be effective because during this 
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period the rate of a real GDP growth increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus 
reduced consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation (2002Q4-2003Q3) 
seems to be expenditure based as it was associated with decrease in intermediate 
consumption, compensation of employees, social benefits, capital transfers and capital 
investments. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period 
increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. Third, 
one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to be revenue based (during 
this period CAPB improved despite increase in government expenditures) and main 
contribution refers to increase in social contributions, sales and capital transfers. It seems to 
be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. During this 
period REER followed appreciation trend and thus reduced consolidation effort. Forth, one-
year unsuccessful consolidation (2011Q1-2011Q4) seems to be both expenditures and 
revenue based and main contribution refers to decrease in compensation of employees and 
social benefits and increase in indirect taxes and direct taxes, sales and other current revenues. 
It seems to be ineffective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period decreased. 
During this episode REER did not experience any significant shift and thus it was in neutral 
stance. Fifth, one-year unsuccessful consolidation (2013Q1-2013Q4) seems to be revenue 
based (during this period CAPB improved despite increase in government expenditures) and 
main contribution refers to increase in indirect taxes, direct taxes, social contributions and 
sales. It seems to be effective because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period 
increased. During this period REER appreciated and thus reduced consolidation effort. 
 
In general, we have identified 66 episodes of both types – one-year consolidations (49) 
and gradual consolidations (17). However, only 24 percent of one-year consolidation episodes 
(12 cold showers) and 23 percent of gradual consolidation episodes (4 multi-year 
consolidations) succeeded. It seems that governments in our sample of countries significantly 
seek an effort to undertake fiscal consolidations and thus strengthen financial discipline 
during a significant period of their political cycle. Our results indicate that more than half of 
all consolidation episodes (55 percent of one-year and 53 percent of multi-year 
consolidations) were conducted during the crisis period) though all successful one-year and 
half of successful multi-year consolidations occurred during the pre-crisis period. As a result, 
tightened fiscal conditions and strongly demanded improvements in the fiscal discipline 
during the crisis period was not followed by generally needed periods (either one-year or 
multi-year) of successful consolidations that would reduce the burden of increasing sovereign 
debt. Moreover, it also reveals wasted chance of successful fiscal consolidation that would 
governments undertake during “good (pre-crisis) times”. 
 
Table 2 summarizes consolidation efforts in the Euro Area member countries during 
the period 2000-2015. 
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Table 2 Summary of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes in the Euro Area (2000-2015) 
type of 
consolidation episode 
expenditure 
based 
revenue 
based 
expenditure and revenue 
based 
result successful unsuccessful successful unsuccessful successful unsuccessful 
GDP + - + - + - + - + - + - 
NEER A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D 
2000-2007 
one-year 3     1 1   1 1 1       1 2     3 1   3 2   1 1 
multi-year     1   1   1               2   1         1 1   
2007-2015 
one-year           2 1 3         1 2 4 3         3 1 4 3 
multi-year   1                     1 2 1 2       1   1     
 
Note: GDP (+) represents positive effect of the fiscal consolidation episode on the real output, GDP (-) 
represents negative effect of the fiscal consolidation episode on the real output, NEER (A) - nominal effective 
exchange rate appreciated during specified fiscal consolidation episode, NEER (D) - nominal effective exchange 
rate depreciated during specified fiscal consolidation episode. 
x successful fiscal consolidation episode, x unsuccessful fiscal consolidation episode 
x - number of consolidation episodes of a specified type; higher is the number, darker is the color 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Brief overview of fiscal consolidation efforts in the Euro Area countries indicates that 
most of the successful consolidation episodes are concentrated to the pre-crisis period and are 
of the one-year pattern. It seems that if governments were willing to improve a fiscal 
discipline than it was mostly on the one-year basis revealing lack of intention to preserve 
fiscal sustainability over longer horizon of their political cycle. Most of successful one-year 
consolidations were conducted solely via cuts in government expenditures or in combination 
with increases in government revenues (only one third of them had a negative effect on the 
real output). At the same time, one-year consolidations conducted during the crisis period 
were clearly unsuccessful while most of them were conducted via increases in government 
revenues or in combination with cuts in government expenditures (more than two third of 
them had a negative effect on the real output). Finally, exchange rate shifts and associated 
improvements and deteriorations in the international price competitiveness did not have a 
significant influence on the rate of success of the conducted fiscal consolidations during 
identified episodes. 
 
Overview of fiscal consolidation episodes in the Euro Area: 
 66 consolidation episodes of both types: 
 49 one-year consolidations (22 during pre-crisis period) 
 17 multi-year consolidations (8 during pre-crisis period) 
 16 successful episodes (24 percent): 
 12 one-year consolidations (all during pre-crisis period) 
 4 multi-year consolidations (2 during pre-crisis period) 
 Pre-crisis period: 
 36 (30) consolidations during the crisis (pre-crisis) period 
 6 of 8 multi-year consolidations (just 2 successful) had negative effect on the real 
output 
 8 of 22 one-year consolidations (12 successful) had negative effect on the real output 
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 Whole period: 
 From 22 revenue based consolidations we found just 1 successful (in pre-crisis 
period)! From remaining 21 unsuccessful consolidations just 12 (10 during the crisis 
period) had negative effect on the real output. 
 From 17 expenditure based consolidations we found 6 successful (just 1 in crisis 
period). From remaining 11 unsuccessful consolidations just 7 (4 during the crisis 
period) had negative effect on the real output. 
 From 27 both revenue and expenditure based consolidations we found 9 successful 
(just 1 during the crisis period). From remaining 18 unsuccessful consolidations just 
10 (7 during the crisis period) had negative effect on the real output. 
 Exchange rate adjustment (appreciation or depreciation) did not affect the rate of 
success of fiscal consolidation efforts though it occurred mostly during unsuccessful 
consolidation episodes. 
 
5. Fiscal Policy Shocks 
5.1 Econometric Model 
VAR models represent dynamic systems of equations in which the current level of each 
variable depends on past movements of that variable and all other variables involved in the 
system. Residuals of vector tε  represent unexplained movements in variables (effects of 
exogenous shocks hitting the model); however as complex functions of structural shocks 
effects they have no economic interpretation. Structural shocks can be still recovered using 
transformation of the true form representation into the reduced-form by imposing a number of 
identifying restrictions. Applied restrictions should reflect some general assumptions about 
the underlying structure of the economy and they are obviously derived from economic 
theory. There are two general (most used) approaches to identify VAR models. (I) Cholesky 
decomposition of innovations implies the contemporaneous interactions between exogenous 
shocks and the endogenous variables are characterized by a Wald causal chain. Ordering of 
endogenous variables then reflects expected particular economy structure following general 
economic theory assumptions. However, the lack of reasonable guidance for appropriate 
ordering led to the development of more sophisticated and flexible identification methods - 
(II) structural VAR (SVAR) models. Identifying restrictions implemented in SVAR models 
reflect theoretical assumptions about the economy structure more precisely. However, 
restrictions based on the theoretical assumptions employed in both identifying schemes 
should be empirically tested to avoid shocks identification bias and imprecisions associated 
with endogenous variables responses to the shocks. 
Understanding effects of fiscal policy shocks (positive government expenditure shock, 
positive direct and indirect tax revenue shock) on real output would help us to examine an 
impact of an initiation of the fiscal consolidation episodes. As a result, we should be able to 
reveal an appropriateness of fiscal revenues and expenditures based adjustments in each 
particular economy. Comparison of results for pre-crisis and extended period seems to be 
convenient to identify effects of the crisis period on the reasonability of particular fiscal 
adjustments. 
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Approach we use in our analysis to estimate effects of the fiscal policy shocks is based 
on the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. In order to recover the structural shocks 
that affect the endogenous variables of the model we implement two identification 
approaches. First approach is based on the recursive Cholesky decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix of the model residuals. The recursive identification approach also considers 
the causal ordering of the variables. Second approach is based on the identification scheme 
that imposes long-run restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the model residuals. 
Nevertheless both approaches uses different scheme to recover structural shocks we expect 
they both provide comparable results of the effects of the fiscal policy shocks in the Euro 
Area member countries. 
True model is represented by the following infinite vector moving average 
representation: 
 
-10 ( )  tttY A L Y BA ε+=      (7) 
 
where tY  is a   1n x  vector of the endogenous macroeconomic variables, ( )A L  is a 
polynomial variance-covariance matrix (represents impulse-response functions of the shocks 
to the elements of Y) of lag-length l, L is lag operator and ( )tε  is a   1k x  vector of identically 
normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal white noise disturbances 
(vector of true structural shocks in elements of Y): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]0,     ' I,    '       0t t t t sE E E t sεε ε ε ε ε= = Σ = = ∀ ≠    (8) 
 
The vector tY  of the endogenous variables of the model consists of the following five 
elements: government expenditures ( )tg , real output ( ),r ty , tax revenues ( )tt , inflation ( )tp  
and long-term interest rates ( )ti . In our five-variate model we assume five exogenous shocks 
that determine endogenous variables - government expenditures shock ( ),g tε , demand shock 
( ),ry tε , tax revenues shock ( ),t tε , inflation shock ( ),p tε  and monetary policy shock ( ),nir tε . 
By multiplying equation (7) by an inverse matrix 10−A  we obtain the reduced-form of 
the VAR model (this adjustment is necessary because the model represented by the equation 
(7) is not directly observable and structural shocks cannot by correctly identified): 
 
1 1
1 10 0        ( ) ( )t tt t tA A uY A L Y C L YBε− −− −+ = +=     (9) 
 
where ( )C L  is again a matrix representing the relationship among variables on the lagged 
values and tu  is a   1n x  vector of normally distributed shocks (shocks in reduced form) that 
are serially uncorrelated but can be contemporaneously correlated with each other: 
31 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1 12 13
2
12 1 23
2
13 23 1
0,     '  ,    '       0ut t t t sE u E u u E u u t s
s s s
s s s
s s s
 
 
= = Σ = = ∀ ≠ 
 
 
   (10) 
 
Equation (9) reveals the relationship between reduced-form VAR disturbances tu  and 
structural disturbances ( )tε , that is given by 
 
1
0 = t tu A Bε−  or 0  = t tA u Bε      (11) 
 
As we have already mentioned we implement an identification scheme based on two 
approaches. The first, recursive approach, is based on the Cholesky decomposition of 
innovations that allows us to identify structural shocks hitting the model. Cholesky 
decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of VAR residuals defines the matrix 0A  as a 
lower triangular matrix and matrix B  as k-dimensional identity matrix. 
The lower triangularity of 0A  implies a recursive scheme among variables that has 
clear economic implications and has to be empirically tested as any other relationship. 
Identification scheme of the matrix 0A  implies that some structural shocks have no 
contemporaneous effects on some endogenous variables given the ordering of the endogenous 
variables. 
At the same time the off-diagonal elements of B are all zero, implying that we do not 
allow for the structural shocks to be mutually correlated. This assumption is consistent with 
empirical results - the correlation between government spending and tax revenue shocks is not 
statistically different from zero. 
 
The equation (11) we can now rewrite to the following form: 
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    (12) 
 
The ordering of variables reveals following relations among them: 
• Government expenditures don’t respond contemporaneously to the shock from any 
other endogenous variable of the model. 
• Real output doesn’t respond contemporaneously to inflation, tax revenue and interest 
rate shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected only by the government 
expenditure shock. 
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• Inflation doesn’t respond contemporaneously to the tax revenue and interest rate 
shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected by the government expenditure and the 
real output shocks. 
• Tax revenues don’t respond contemporaneously to the interest rates shock, while it is 
contemporaneously affected by the government expenditure, the real output and tax 
revenue shocks. 
• Interest rates are contemporaneously affected by the shocks from all of the 
endogenous variables of the model. 
 
It is also necessary to emphasize that after the initial period the endogenous variables 
of the model can interact freely without any restrictions. 
 
The second approach, structural VAR (SVAR) approach, is based on decomposing a 
series into its permanent and temporary components. It imposes long-run restrictions to the 
reduced-form VAR model. Identification scheme in the SVAR models reflects a long-run 
neutrality assumption so that we expect the cumulative effect of a certain shock on the certain 
endogenous variable development is zero. The equation (11) we can now rewrite to the 
following form: 
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In order to correctly identify the model we impose following long-run restrictions: 
• Government expenditures do not have a permanent effect on tax revenues. 
• Real output does not have a permanent effect on government expenditures and 
inflation. 
• Inflation does not have a permanent effect on government expenditures and real 
output. 
• Tax revenues do not have a permanent effect on government expenditures. 
• Interest rates do not have a permanent effect on any other endogenous variable of the 
model. 
 
Both systems are now just-identified and can be estimated using vector autoregression. 
From both identified true models we compute impulse-response functions to estimate the 
responses of the real output to the one standard deviation fiscal shocks. Effects of fiscal 
consolidating adjustments on the real output are calculated for two periods (pre-crisis with 
data 2000Q1-2007Q4 (model A) and extended with data 2000Q1-2015Q2 (model B)) to 
reveal crisis effects on fiscal consolidation efforts. Effects of shocks in each particular fiscal 
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variable (positive (increase in) one standard deviation government expenditure shock ( ),ε g t , 
direct tax revenues shock ( ),εdt t  and indirect tax revenues shock ( ),ε it t ) on the 
macroeconomic performance were computed from separately estimated VAR models. As a 
result, three models were estimated with following endogenous variables: 
• model A1, B1 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p t iY =     
• model A2, B2 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p dt iY =     
• model A3, B3 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p it iY =     
Impulse-response functions calculated from estimated VAR models with true shocks 
identified employing both identification schemes (based on Cholesky factorization and 
structural factorization) provided very similar results that is why we present results from 
structural VAR models (estimated results from models identified by recursive identification 
scheme are available upon request from the author). However, under Cholesky identification 
structure, the real government spending is not contemporaneously (within the same quarter) 
affected by changes in the real economic activity. That is the reason why government 
expenditure shock is considered as a discretionary fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, tax 
revenues are contemporaneously affected by the changes in the real economic activity and 
thus respond automatically to the real output adjustments. 
As a result, structural VAR models seem to be more convenient for estimation of 
discrete fiscal shocks (both expenditure and revenue based) because recursive approach is 
sensitive to variables ordering and thus it has impact on shocks interpretation. However, 
Cholesky decomposition of innovations is more convenient to trace the distribution of the 
shock inside the country as it considers the underlying structure of the economy. In our 
model, tax revenues are positioned behind real output. As a result, associated changes in tax 
revenues could be interpreted as automatic response to changes in real output (due to cyclical 
adjustment) and operating more as automatic stabilizers while it rules out any impact response 
out real output to a revenue shock (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
 
5.2 Data and Results 
In order to estimate our model represented by five endogenous variables for each Euro 
Area member country we employ quarterly data ranging from 2000Q1 to 2007Q4 (32 
observations) for model A and quarterly data from 2000Q1 to 2015Q2 (62 observations) for 
model B for the government expenditures, real gross domestic product, inflation, tax revenues 
and long-term interest rates (figure 7). Time series for endogenous variables were drawn from 
Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (November 2015) and IMF database - International 
Financial Statistics (November 2015). 
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Figure 7 Government Expenditures, Real output, Inflation, Tax Revenues and Interest 
Rates in the Euro Area member countries (2000Q1-2015Q2) 
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Note: Endogenous variables - government expenditures (GOV_E), real output (GDP), tax revenues (GOV_T), 
direct tax revenues (GOV_DT) and indirect tax revenues (GOV_IT) are expressed as indexes (left axis in 
figures) (2005 = 100). Inflation (CPI) and interest rates (IR) are expressed in percentage (right axis in figures). 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2016) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (October 2016). 
 
Time series for the quarterly government expenditures, real output and tax revenues 
were seasonally adjusted. Time series for the nominal government expenditures and tax 
revenues were deflated using gross domestic product deflator. As an inflation indicator we 
used core inflation without food and energy. As a long-term interest rates indicator we used 
nominal interest rates on 10-year government bonds. 
Before we estimate the model it is necessary to test the time series for stationarity and 
cointegration. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were 
computed to test the endogenous variables for the existence of unit roots. Both ADF and PP 
tests indicate that most variables are non-stationary on the values so that the null hypothesis 
of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the series. Testing variables on the first differences 
indicates the time series are stationary so that we conclude that variables are I(1). 
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Because most of endogenous variables had a unit root on values it is necessary to test 
time series for cointegration using the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test (we found it 
reasonable to include variables I(0) for testing purposes following economic logic of expected 
results). The test for the cointegration was computed using two lags as recommended by the 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion). The results of 
the Johansen cointegration tests confirmed the results of the unit root tests. Both trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics (both at 0.05 level) indicate that there is no 
cointegration among endogenous variables in most of estimated models (trace statistics 
reported a presence of single cointegrating equation in some models). However, increasing 
the lag length to three quarters resulted in the loss of long-run equilibrium among variables. 
The results of unit root and cointegration tests are not reported here to save space. Like any 
other results, they are available upon request from the author. 
To test the stability of the VAR model we also applied a number of diagnostic tests. 
We found no evidence of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity effect in the disturbances. The model also passes the Jarque-Bera normality 
test, so that errors seem to be normally distributed. The VAR models seem to be stable also 
because the inverted roots of the model for each country lie inside the unit. 
 
Before we estimate VAR model we have to solve some model specification issues. In 
section 4.3 we have estimated four bivariate models consisting of one particular fiscal 
variable and real output considering that there exist long-run equilibrium relationships in each 
model. Existence of cointegrating relationship (assumption widely confirmed by many 
empirical studies) was required to calculate income elasticities of budgetary categories. 
Presence on one cointegrating equation in each model was confirmed by Johansen 
cointegrating test statistics. Thus, we have estimated VEC models. 
However, testing five-variate models in section 5.2 for cointegration revealed 
ambiguous results. While trace statistics mostly confirmed the presence of single 
cointegrating equation, maximum eigenvalue statistics reported no cointegration in majority 
of countries (both at 0.05 level). Despite possible candidates for cointegration (fiscal variables 
and real output) we may find another potential couple of variables for cointegration - tax 
revenues and government expenditures, though according to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) the 
imposition of a cointegration between government expenditures and tax revenues leads to 
very similar results in estimated effects of fiscal shocks (as a result such an expected 
cointegration may be confusing in estimating the cointegration rank). At the same time, 
Caldara and Camps (2008) suggest that in order to avoid imposing a wrong cointegration rank 
(in systems with just one ambiguous cointegration it seems to be quite disputable) it may be 
convenient to estimate unrestricted VAR models instead of VEC models. 
 
Following the results of the stationarity and cointegration tests we estimate three 
SVAR models for pre-crisis (2000Q1-2007Q4) and extended period (2000Q1-2015Q2) for 
each country from the Euro Area using the variables in the first differences to calculate 
impulse-response functions of government expenditures, direct taxes and indirect taxes 
(responses of the real output to a positive one standard deviation government expenditures 
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shock and positive one standard deviation tax revenues shocks). Estimated responses of the 
real output fiscal shocks help us to evaluated macroeconomic effects of revenue and 
expenditure based fiscal adjustments and thus assess indirect costs of fiscal consolidation. At 
the same time, by estimating models for pre-crisis and extended period we evaluate crisis 
related costs of fiscal adjustments. 
In figures 8-10 we summarize the responses of the real output to the positive (increase 
in) government expenditure shock and positive (increase) direct and indirect tax revenues 
during the pre-crisis period (model A1 with data 2000Q1-2007Q4) in the Euro Area member 
countries. In figures 11-13 we summarize the responses of the real output to the positive 
(increase in) government expenditure shock and positive (increase) direct and indirect tax 
revenues during the extended period (model B1 with data 2000Q1-2015Q2) in the Euro Area 
member countries. 
In the figure 8 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation government expenditures for the model with time series for the pre-crisis period 
(model A1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
 
Figure 8 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Government Expenditures Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Positive shock (increase in) government expenditures shock was followed by the real 
output increase in Euro Area member countries. We have examined some differences in the 
initial as well as short-term responsiveness of the real output followed by the positive shock 
in government expenditures. However, the positive effect of the shock culminated within first 
two years and steadily died out during the third year since the shock. Government 
expenditures shock had just a temporary effect on the real output that is why it seems to be 
neutral in the long run. 
Identified differences in the short-term response patterns of the real output reveals 
opened questions associated with distortionary effects of expenditure oriented changes in the 
fiscal stance across the Euro Area member countries (Kickert, Randma-Liiv and Savi, 2013). 
As a result, the relative contribution of government spending to reduced synchronization of 
business cycles among the Euro Area members during the pre-crisis period or more generally 
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in good times represents an important lesson learned for a future coordination in the national 
fiscal policy frameworks. 
 
In the figure 9 we summarize responses of the real output to the positive one standard 
deviation shock of direct tax revenues for the model with time series for the pre-crisis period 
(model A1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
 
Figure 9 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Direct Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Positive (increase in) direct tax revenues shock was associated with a decline in the 
real output in all Euro Area member countries. Short-term responsiveness of the real output to 
the direct tax revenue shock was generally more dynamic in comparison with the government 
expenditure shock. Changes in direct taxes caused the real output decline during 2-3 years 
following initial impulse till the negative effect completely died out. 
Fiscal consolidations based on direct tax changes are generally less popular and 
mostly employed on a selective basis (i.e. progressive taxing or increased tax burdens on the 
higher incomes classes). We suggest that governments should avoid employing consolidation 
based on the changes in direct taxes due to revealed sizeable negative effects on the real 
output (Wöhlbier, Astarita and Mourre, 2014). Moreover, tax increases seem to be much more 
costly way of achieving fiscal sustainability compared with spending restraint (Cournède and 
Gonand, 2006). On the other hand, when revenue based fiscal consolidations (increase in 
direct taxes) are later accompanied by broader consolidation strategy involving a reduction in 
current spending (so called switching strategies), consolidation effort is obviously more 
effective though politically sensitive (von Hagen, 2002). 
 
In the figure 10 we summarize responses of the real output to the positive one standard 
deviation shock of indirect tax revenues for the model with time series for the pre-crisis 
period (model A1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
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Figure 10 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Indirect Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Deterioration, though delayed in comparison with direct taxes, in the real output also 
occurred after the unexpected positive (increase in) indirect tax revenues shock. Despite some 
differences identified across individual countries it seems that the negative effect of the shock 
culminated during the third year after the shock. Moreover, initial response of the real output 
is mostly weak, even slightly positive in some countries and moderately increases over the 
time after the first year since the shock. Negative effect of the shock seems to be neutral in the 
long run as its impact of the real output died out during the third year after the shock (in 
almost all countries). 
Revenue based fiscal adjustments associated with indirect tax changes deteriorate real 
output with increased lag in comparison with effects of direct tax increase thought the overall 
dynamics of the real output decrease is clearly comparable. As a result, adjustments in 
indirect taxes seem to be more convenient for short-term consolidations as their side effect on 
the real output are distributed across several years. 
However, effects of revenue based adjustments relying on indirect tax increases are 
usually accompanied by higher spending that partially offset consolidation efforts. In such a 
case, fiscal consolidation achieves smaller improvements in the fiscal stance, has shorter 
duration and is more backtracking (Larch and Turrini, 2008). 
 
Analysis of the real output responsiveness to the positive fiscal policy shocks revealed 
interesting side (macroeconomic) implications of the fiscal adjustments associated with tax 
(revenue) and expenditure based fiscal consolidation in the Euro Area member countries. 
Unexpected increase in both government expenditures and tax (both direct and indirect) 
revenues induced deterioration in the real output. While effects of the expenditure based 
adjustments were more significant within the first year since the shock, effects of both direct 
and indirect tax based adjustments generally dominated during the second and third year since 
the shock. Moreover, effects of unexpected changes in taxes are generally followed by more 
responsive adjustments in real output. We suggest that expenditure based fiscal adjustments 
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are more appropriate for episodes based on the gradual fiscal consolidations provided that 
(negative) distortionary effects on the real output is reduced during the years following the 
one-year large consolidating fiscal adjustment. Moreover, shocks in government expenditures 
have less distortionary effect on the real output. On the other hand, effects of adjustments in 
direct but mainly in indirect tax revenues were largely distributed across several years (with 
slightly reduced deteriorating effect during the second year since the direct tax shock and 
third year since indirect tax shock in most countries) and thus we suggest that revenue based 
fiscal adjustments are more appropriate for episodes of one-year fiscal consolidations. 
However, delayed deterioration in the real output together with expected benefits of reduced 
public debt burden (in case of successful one-year consolidation) favors consolidation efforts 
based on indirect tax changes. 
 
In the figure 11 we summarize responses of the real output to the positive one standard 
deviation government expenditures for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
 
Figure 11 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Government Expenditures Shock  
(2000Q1-2015Q2) (Model B) 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_AT to GOV_E_AT
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_BE to GOV_E_BE
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_CY to GOV_E_CY
(model B)
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_DE to GOV_E_DE
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_EE to GOV_E_EE
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_ES to GOV_E_ES
(model B)
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_FI to GOV_E_FI
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_FR to GOV_E_FR
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_GR to GOV_E_GR
(model B)
 
 
44 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_IE to GOV_E_IE
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_IT to GOV_E_IT
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_LT to GOV_E_LT
(model B)
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_LU to GOV_E_LU
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_LV to GOV_E_LV
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_MT to GOV_E_MT
(model A)
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_NE to GOV_E_NE
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_PT to GOV_E_PT
(model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of  GDP_Si to GOV_E_SI
(model B)
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of GDP_SK to GOV_E_SK
(model B)
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Crisis period affected responsiveness of real output to the positive (increase in) 
government expenditures shock in individual countries with a changing pattern. Both intensity 
and durability of the positive real output response considerably increased thought overall 
effect in the long-run remained neutral (and effect of the shock mostly died out during the 
third year since the shock). It seems that the crisis period intensified positive effects 
associated with government expenditure based adjustments. We suggest that the time 
vulnerability of real output to the expenditure based fiscal adjustments during the crisis period 
generally increased. However, considering increased positive responsiveness of the real 
output to the government spending shocks some authors suggest that increase in public 
investments during bad times is associated with disputable effects on private consumption as 
well as private investments that are either positive (i.e. Afonso, Grüner and Kolerus, 2010; 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2011) or negative (Bruckner and Tuladhar, 2011; Corsetti, 
Meier and Müller, 2012). Provided that the size of fiscal expenditure multiplier generally 
45 
 
decreased during the crisis period (Warmedinger, Checherita-Westphal and Hernández De 
Cos, 2015) reducing negative effects of expenditure based fiscal consolidation of the real 
output we find cuts in public spending more appropriate way of improving fiscal discipline 
and maintaining fiscal sustainability. 
 
In the figure 12 we summarize responses of the real output to the positive one standard 
deviation shock of direct tax revenues for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
 
Figure 12 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Direct Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2015Q2) (Model B) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Responsiveness of the real output to the positive (increase in) direct tax revenues 
shock during the extended period increased in all Euro Area member countries. We suggest 
that the crisis period increased the overall vulnerability of the real output to the direct tax 
revenues based adjustment in terms of both the (longer) durability of the deteriorating effect 
as well as its (larger) size. Similarly to our results from the pre-crisis period we have observed 
that the overall effect of the shock was neutral in the long run as its effect died out till the end 
of the third year in all countries from the group. As a result, real output became more 
vulnerable (as of intensity as well as durability of the effect) to direct tax based fiscal 
adjustments during the crisis period. Higher negative responsiveness of the real output to the 
direct tax increase during the second year since the shock corresponds to the idea that tax 
multipliers are higher in the medium term and long term (i.e. Coenen et al., 2012; Boussard, 
De Castro and Salto, 2012; Erceg and Lindé, 2012) that is why we suggest that direct tax 
based fiscal consolidations are more appropriate for one-year fiscal episodes of improving 
fiscal discipline and maintaining fiscal sustainability. 
 
In the figure 13 we summarize responses of the real output to the positive one standard 
deviation shock of indirect tax revenues for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the Euro Area member countries. 
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Figure 13 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Indirect Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2015Q2) (Model B) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Examination of the real output responsiveness to the positive (increase in) indirect tax 
revenues shock during the extended period in the Euro Area countries revealed very similar 
pattern in the results in comparison with the real output vulnerability to the direct tax 
revenues shock. Our results indicate that despite increased deterioration in the real output, all 
countries from the group have also experienced higher time persistence of the deteriorating 
effect of the shock. As a result, the negative effect of the tax revenues shock on the real output 
persisted around 3-4 years and thus slightly extended side effects of the indirect tax (revenue) 
based fiscal adjustments during the crisis period. Similarly to our results from the figure 12 
we suggest that indirect tax based fiscal adjustments are more suitable for one-year fiscal 
consolidations due to less deteriorating effect on the real output during the first year of fiscal 
episode. Moreover, as the periphery economies are more focused on indirect taxes on the 
revenue side of their public budgets (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009; Zai, 2012), indirect tax 
increase may be more efficient for improving the fiscal stance (Bildirici and Cosar, 2005) 
provided that governments manage to reduce associated negative side effects on the real 
output during the subsequent years (Princen and Mourre, 2013) and keeps (or reduces) the 
size of tax evasion and avoidance (Tagkalakis, 2014). 
 
Our results indicate that effects of the fiscal policy shocks on the real output during 
the crisis period slightly increased. As a result, consolidation efforts associated with sizeable 
fiscal adjustments are followed by more deteriorating effect on the economic activity that is 
why the overall composition of fiscal consolidation is crucial for improving both fiscal 
discipline and fiscal sustainability while reducing its negative side effects. 
Provided that the overall success of consolidating efforts during the crisis period is 
reduced due to excessive pressures on both revenues and expenditure sides it seems that 
increased durability of real output responsiveness, followed by tax and/or revenue based 
adjustments, significantly reduced a degree of success to perform an effective (without side 
effects on real output) fiscal consolidation. 
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6. Conclusion 
Recent debt crisis and economic recession put governments of the Euro Area member 
countries under pressure to preserve fiscal discipline and get fiscal deficits and sovereign 
debts under the control. However, a significant reduction of growth potential due to 
deterioration in the overall demand resulted in designing an appropriate duration (one-year 
versus several years lasting fiscal adjustments) and composition (expenditure or/and revenue 
based fiscal adjustments) of consolidating efforts that would reduce associated negative side 
effects on the economic activity and still improve fiscal sustainability. 
Our results indicate that the rate of success of consolidation efforts significantly 
decreased during the crisis period. Most of fiscal consolidations were conducted on the one-
year basis that indicates a lack of intention to improve fiscal discipline over longer horizon of 
their political cycle. However, most of them were unsuccessful during the crisis period. At the 
same time, most of one-year consolidations were associated with revenue based adjustments 
(or combined with expenditure cuts) and had mainly deteriorating effect on the real output 
favoring expenditure based adjustments that were generally less harmful on the real output. 
Estimated responsiveness of the real output to the fiscal policy shocks in the Euro 
Area member countries revealed interesting implications about the time distribution of the 
side effects of unexpected fiscal adjustments on the economic activity. While the effects of 
expenditure based adjustments were more significant within the first year since the shock (and 
had less distortionary effect on the real output), effects of both direct and indirect tax based 
adjustments generally dominated during the second and third year since the shock. We 
suggest that expenditure based fiscal adjustments are more appropriate for episodes based on 
the gradual fiscal consolidations provided that (negative) distortionary effects on the real 
output is reduced during the years following the large consolidating fiscal adjustment 
conducted in the first year of the episode. On the other hand, revenue based fiscal adjustments 
seem to be more appropriate for episodes of one-year fiscal consolidations due to less 
deteriorating effect on the real output during the first year of fiscal episode provided that 
governments manage to reduce associated negative side effects on the real output during the 
subsequent years. 
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